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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMED FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF PRACTICAL TRAINING FOR TANKERS DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84, (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 8

[Article by Senior Warrant Officer N. Rimel', Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Skills Aren't An End In Themselves"]

[Text] After the numerous training exercises on developing skills in operating the equipment and weapons we were sure that our tankers would operate skillfully in the tactical training with live ammunition. But the exercise began and errors followed one after another.

When the tankers formed their combat line, they moved along in parade formation. Mechanic-drivers Privates V. Seitbayev, Ye. Torskiy and V. Yermonov chose the easy roads whereas condition required that they disperse in covered terrain.

At the open fire line there was a machine gun in Corporal G. Nichko's field of vision and he destroyed it as per the scheme of actions that had been developed in the exercise. Of course this was an important target, but compared to the recoilless rifle mounted on the vehicle which had appeared simultaneously with the machine gun, it was a secondary target for the tank.

One got the impression that in general the poorly trained specialists were operating not on a battlefield but in a sporting event to see who could be first to opened fire, reached an indicated line, etc. Naturally every target that was not destroyed and every error in maneuvering lowered the crew's scores.

Why did the tankers, who in training had exceeded norms and had shown solid skills, allow so many errors in the exercise?

As an officer from the next higher headquarters indicated at the critique, these skills could not bring success as they had been acquired mechanically. The tankers didn't learn to apply them skillfully to the specific conditions of modern battle.

We can see this during training. A sergeant gives a command, starts a stopwatch and watches only that the student completes that combat movement as quickly as possible. And he frequently pays no attention to whether or not the specialist's actions are correct.

For example Sergeant R. Alimov requires that his mechanic-driver, Private V. Yermonov, reach a high speed at the tank training area. And Yermonov tries. But ask Yermonov what he saw of the terrain and he answers, "Nothing but obstacles and the ribbed tracks of treads."

But in battle, in addition to maneuvering with levers and pedals, he has to search in his own observation sector and classify targets, give target designations and select a good route.

When and how does he learn this? Of course, during the hours of planned exercises. But at such exercises which would tear apart the framework of its one narrowly specialized theme. In my opinion, the method of integrating marksmanship, tactical and special training issues offers major advantages here.

Corresponding documents give recommendations, but they are acceptable only for tank formation exercises and we are applying the integration method fully in marksmanship training which should be conducted against a backdrop of a complicated tactical situation. For example, one could develop it on a field in front of the tank firing complex.

Imagine such an exercise. They complete training fire in the tank firing complex. The tactical situation created is that the "enemy" is defending a position in the area of a hillock and targets periodically appear there. The crew fires. However you can't make out what each of the soldiers inside the tank armor is doing. But if you connected the outlet channel of the tank intercom system to an amplifier on the exercise chief instructor's console all the students' actions would be as clear as if they were in the palm of your hand. The chief instructor could judge them by the flow of target designations and reports that rang out in the flow of the exercise. The tank commander and gunner control fire and the mechanic-driver paves the march route.

Let's say that targets appear on the slope of the hillock, but in such a sequence that the students have to change initial firing data several times, decide on a maneuver and complete the exercise setting, that is, act according to the situation. The exercise chief instructor follows their actions and this allows him to evaluate the crew's actions and note errors and inaccuracies. Moreover, the tank commander, gunner and mechanic-driver receive many marks in their training documents by the end of the exercise and one can judge by these marks who is able to creatively apply skills.

Hooking the outlet channel of the TPU [tank intercom system] to the chief instructor's amplifier is not particularly novel but it allows one to simultaneously resolve fire missions, develop tactical and special issues and develop complete skills, initiative and a creative attitude toward combat work in the soldiers.

The path to professional maturity for us, tankers, is complicated. Skills don't come immediately and nor does the ability to apply them effectively. So

that a skill acquired in class or in training is then skillfully applied on the battlefield and is of maximum benefit, a junior commander must develop in his subordinates the necessary skills while accomplishing a specific military training mission.

I am sure that with such an exercise organization the improvement of skills will become not an end in itself but a means for achieving victory in modern battle.

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CSO: 1801/407

ARMED FORCES

DRAFTEES RIGHT TO FORMER HOUSING, SCHOOLS EXPLAINED

Moscow RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by G. Sivolobova in the legal advice column of the "Saturday Mosaic" section: "During Temporary Absence"]

[Text] N. Prin'ko of Sumy asks:

I have been drafted into military service. Will I get my apartment back when I return?

Military servicemen on active duty, as well as reserve officers called up to active duty for periods of up to three years, retain first rights to their living quarters upon their return over the entire course of their military service time. For shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, and for career military service personnel the retention right to living quarters occupied up until entry into service is reserved for the first five years of active duty service.

Citizens who must temporarily leave their permanent places of residence due to the conditions and nature of their jobs (ships' crewmembers, members of geological and exploratory parties, expeditions, etc.), or in connection with their training (students--undergraduate, postgraduate, and others), retain the right to return to their former housing for the entire period in which they are performing their assigned work or training.

Children placed in a state institution for childhood education, or in the care of relatives, a guardian or trustee, do not lose the right to reoccupy their former residence (regardless of the length of their stay in such institutions or with the aforementioned persons), with the stipulation that other members of the family continue to reside in the specified dwelling. In the event such family members leave the original residence, and said housing is assigned to other persons, or becomes unsuitable for their habitation for other reasons, then, upon completion of the period of enrollment in the state institution, or return from the care of relatives, guardian or trustee, such children will be assigned other housing immediately by the executive committee of the local Council of People's Deputies in accordance with the most recent permanent place of residence.

9481

CSO: 1801/405

ARMED FORCES

NEED FOR BETTER PERFORMANCE IN TRAINING EXERCISES STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Outstanding Effectiveness in the Training Exercises"]

[Text] Summer combat training is in full swing. Soviet military personnel are sparing no effort to achieve outstanding performance and effectiveness in every exercise, answering with their deeds the concern of the party for continuing increases in the defensive capacities of the nation. In so doing, they are taking sight of one of the major conditions for successfully performing the missions assigned to them and living up to their commitments made to the competition under the slogan, "Be on guard, and in constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism!"

Improvement in the performance and effectiveness of military operations is inseparably tied to consistent practical application of the most important principle of military training--to provide knowledge which is essential for combat situations. Some of the factors determining the readiness of land and sea-based units for combat, which must receive constant attention from training coordinators are as follows: firmness and stability of operational control; the ability of commanders to conceive timely solutions to problems which develop unexpectedly under difficult tactical conditions; the ability of personnel to make full use of the combat capabilities of modern weaponry and technology; the ability to withstand the immense physical and psychological pressures which accompany operations at night, in mountainous terrain, in deserts, in the tundra--under the most wide-ranging geographic and climatic conditions; the ability to achieve success in battle with a powerful, aggressive, and technologically well-equipped opponent.

In our time, the military sector has seen an unprecedented level of development. Nuclear, as well as conventional weapons are being continually improved. Modern armies are being outfitted with precision combat gear. Under such conditions, the primary emphasis must be on training personnel for tactical-fire situations, gaining the capability for first-strike knockdown of targets, attaining maximum range launches under night, as well as daytime conditions, and on achieving readiness for dealing the enemy a decisive and unexpected blow, using all available forces and capabilities. Continued improvement also calls for drilling and physical conditioning.

Unfortunately, there are some places where the organizational and methodological approaches to military exercises is still not up to the level of current requirements. Practical experience tells us that one of the reasons for this situation is the fact that exercise supervisors have insufficient training in the use of proper techniques. This is particularly true of certain N-unit (Central Group of Forces) officers, whose subunits are consistently failing to exploit the many means available to them for improving the quality and effectiveness of the training process. To cite an example, this is precisely the same reason that the battalion under the command of Maj G. Kravtsov is forever lagging behind in competition rankings.

This kind of situation is intolerable. The training of exercise supervisors is the critical factor in determining whether or not they are to be effective. It must be conducted in such a way as to ensure that the mastery of all skill levels by commanders as combat coordinators will continue to grow, that they develop to perfection the art of managing heterogeneous forces and capabilities, while coordinating their interaction, and that they are capable of teaching the intricacies of modern warfare to their subordinates. And, lastly, there can be no excusing those who try to conduct exercises under lenient conditions, who are content with lax requirements.

The effort to achieve outstanding effectiveness and quality in the training process presupposes its continued intensification. And this will never be accomplished without a thoughtful approach to the development of plans, the ability to make efficient use of time and pack a maximal amount of material into each training session, to make intelligent use of material resources, nor will it without broad-scale integration of exercises, making use of up-to-date technical training methods. Learning efficiency in the management of training time means, first of all, learning to properly coordinate the military activities of people, to enforce discipline and established order, and to increase each person's sense of responsibility for his assigned duties. Every land and sea-based unit must adopt as an immutable rule of life the strictest observance of official requirements, the precise organization of troop function, the unconditional fulfillment of plans and programs relating to military and political training, as well as close adherence to exercise time-tables and a daily regimen.

An important aid in the effort to achieve outstanding effectiveness in every exercise would be skillful and thorough utilization of socialist competition for the purpose of intensifying the training process. An essential point in making use of accumulated experience is to provide an object-lesson for commanders in the organization of competitions based on missions and standards during exercises and training sessions. Care must be taken, in summarizing results of the competition, to ensure not simply that the marks of the leaders and the laggards are duly noted, but that those who content themselves with average grades are not left out of the overall field of view.

Preparations for the 40th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War are placing a particularly strong imprint on the entire process of training and educating personnel. Commanders, political offices, staffs, party and kom-somol organizations are first and foremost concerning themselves with skillfully

aiming the patriotic fervor of their personnel toward successfully meeting all standards and military training objectives, motivating them to strive through their specific day-to-day activities to add to the military traditions of their units, whether land or sea-based.

It is incumbent upon party and komsomol members to make major contributions to the effort to achieve greater effectiveness in training exercises and competitions. They can make their effect felt through personal example and by showing an implacable attitude toward all displays of oversimplification and overindulgence, self-importance and complacency. They must be strongly encouraged to develop a feeling for the new, supported in their searching for innovative methods, and provided with the latest advances in knowledge. At the same time, they must strongly take issue with those who fail to display proper diligence in the effort to attain greater effectiveness in training exercises. Increasing the impact of party-political work on all aspects of life in military units will allow us to meet the requirements set forth in the CPSU Central Committee decree, "On Continuing Improvement in Party Control of Komsomol and Expanding its Role in the Communist Indoctrination of Youth," and also allow us to implement the recommendations of the All-Army Conference for Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations.

The ongoing effort for increased effectiveness and improved performance in the summer training program is the most important requirement for continued greater combat readiness in land and sea-based forces, and for the successful accomplishment of the missions with which they are tasked.

9481

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ARMED FORCES

MOSCOW TV CITES NBC COMMENTARY ON 'NUCLEAR WINTER'

LD161932 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 16 Aug 84

[From the "World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenکو; announcer-read report]

[Text] John Chancellor, NBC's political observer, has devoted his latest commentary to the possible and probable consequences of a global nuclear war if one should occur. The data he cited, even though it is not new, shows that even in the United States there is growing concern caused by the increase in the nuclear arms race. Chancellor said a new term has entered the political lexicon--nuclear winter.

Many scientists believe as a result of a massive exchange of nuclear strikes, the sun's rays would cease to reach the earth, changes would take place in the atmosphere, and an acute cooling would occur which is given the name nuclear winter. In other words, civilization would end. This theory is supported by over 40 eminent U.S. scientists and a number of well-known Soviet theorists. Their arguments are so weighty, the NBC commentary says, that the Reagan administration has decided to carry out research in this sphere, and has allocated tens of millions of dollars for this.

The nuclear winter theory states that the present nuclear strategy must be revised; a powerful nuclear strike against an opponent--even if it is not followed by a retaliatory strike--is equivalent to suicide. In light of all this, the question arises of the necessity of developing either new, less powerful types of weapons, or a new strategy. The theory of the nuclear winter gives politicians the chance to think about our future. That is how the U.S. journalist Chancellor ended the commentary I have been quoting.

Well, the truth is the truth. There really is something to think about. I do not know whether it is true that the U.S. administration has begun some research in this sphere, which could be followed by either a revision of its nuclear strategy or the development of some sort of hypothetical less-powerful types of weapons. It seems that these assumptions by the U.S. TV observer Chancellor are not based on any reliable facts. On the contrary, for example, the latest already mentioned, well-known scandalous nuclear radio joke by Reagan. He displayed his humor by outlawing Russia, and then saying that in 5 minutes he would give the order to bomb it. This escapade shows that the

U.S. administration is still not aware of the proximity of the abyss toward which it is pushing the whole world, including its own country.

Yes, indeed, competent and authoritative scientists of various countries, including the United States, have already shown that a global nuclear conflict could really lead to the annihilation of civilization. And the most reliable means, the most reliable path for the White House to demonstrate its love of peace, its understanding of the danger of the situation which has arisen is not to order new research in this sphere but to make, or even to propose, some sort of specific, real, and practical steps to reduce the threat, to lower the threshold of nuclear confrontation as our country has frequently done.

Well, for example, who and what, apart from stupid ambitions, prevents the Washington leaders from following the example of the USSR and from undertaking the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? Who and what prevents Washington from intelligently and articulately responding to the proposals made by Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko in March this year to subordinate relations between powers possessing nuclear weapons to certain norms?

Alas, to date, there has been no clear reply from Washington to these or many other Soviet proposals. Judging by everything, Washington does not intend to give any in the near future, either. Therefore, the advice contained in the above-mentioned NBC commentary to politicians to think about the future can and should be fully addressed to the White House.

CSO: 1801/6

ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO ZNAMENOSETS EDITOR, RESPONSES

Illegal Practices Cited

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 15

["Following Up Publications" section]

[Text] The practice of designating so-called "responsible" commissioned and warrant officers in the aviation training regiment entering the Kachinskiy Pilots Training School imeni A.F. Myasnikov was discussed in an article entitled "Comrade Kolomiyets' Veto" (ZNAMENOSETS No 3, 1984). The editor received an official answer signed by the school commandant, Major General of Aviation I. Zheleznyak. He reports that the article was discussed at a meeting of the school's leaders and the incorrect and incompetent actions by the deputy squadron commander for political affairs, Major G. Kolomiyets, were analyzed in detail. The school's soviet also discussed the political officer's actions which did not generally support military discipline and also reviewed the ways and methods for further reinforcing regulatory order in light of the demands by the USSR Minister of Defense.

A two-day course devoted to organizing troop service in garrison was held at the school and representatives of military law agencies participated in the exercises. The functional duties of all officials in maintaining regulatory order in subunits and units were more accurately defined and the school's leadership reinforced control over strict adherence to Articles 243 and 244 of the UGIKS [Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations] through having officials inspect guard, internal and garrison duty.

The magazine article was also discussed at a seminar of the school's political workers. Because of the criticism in the article the seminar held an exercise on the theme "Further Improving The Forms And Methods For Party-Political Work Directed At Strengthening Military Discipline" and presented a lecture "The Characteristic Qualities Of A Political Officer As A Leader-Indoctrinator".

Major Kolomiyets was not allowed to enter the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin in 1984 and a unit partkom [party committee] reviewed the personal affairs of CPSU member Comrade Kolomiyets. He received a severe reprimand for his faulty work style, his rash comments directed at ZNAMENOSETS and his dishonesty. The training regiment's deputy director for political affairs, Lieutenant Colonel V. Surzhikov, was pointed out for negligence in training and indoctrinating subunit political workers.

The school's political section outlined measures aimed at improving the selection, training and indoctrination of the political cadre.

FROM THE EDITOR

While expressing gratitude to Major General of Aviation I. Zheleznyak for his detailed report on measures adopted because of the article "Comrade Kolomiyets' Veto", we unfortunately have to note that the main issue, the illegal practice of designating so-called "responsible" commissioned and warrant officers in the training regiment, was not addressed. Because of this, the editor cannot report to the magazine's readers that this practice was abolished in the unit or whether it still exists as before. We would like to clear this up and we hope that the commanders of the training regiment and the school do not force the editor and the readers to wait long for an answer to the question at hand.

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Bureaucracy Attacked

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 15

["Following Up Publications" section]

[Text] "Fight Bureaucraticism" was the title of correspondence in this year's sixth issue of ZNAMENOSETS. It discussed the fact that the magazine editors continue to receive letters from Army and Navy warrant officers complaining that their personnel files are sent to their new duty stations or to the voyenkomats [military registration and enlistment offices] late.

According to a report that the editor received, this problem was reviewed at the Main Directorate of Cadre for the Ministry of Defense. Cadre organs at military districts, groups of forces, navies and services of the Armed Forces received instructions from the First Deputy Chief of GUK [Main Directorate of Cadre] for the MO [Ministry of Defense], Colonel General V. Goncharov, demanding a drastic improvement in developing and transmitting personnel records and other documents when Army and Navy warrant officers get a service transfer or are discharged to the reserves or retired. Some specific areas of red tape were investigated and the personnel records of Army and Navy warrant officers were sent to their current duty assignments. New personnel records were made for Warrant Officer V. Lobod. Officials guilty of forwarding personnel records late were held accountable.

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Finance Personnel Unresponsive

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 18

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Chernikov, ZNAMENOSSETS correspondent: "And If There Is No Follow-up?"]

[Text] In the large volume of ZNAMENOSSETS mail were many letters in which the magazine's readers shared their happiness and their concerns, asked for advice, sought help and thanked us for assistance.

One day a telegram arrived addressed to the Editor-in-chief, saying, "The commission investigated and the money was paid. Thank you. Warrant Officer A. Doroshev". The magazine's appeal to the appropriate chief helped move the warrant officer's problem off dead center and he received the monetary compensation due him for his rank. The person responsible for late payment was Captain A. Motalov according to Major General V. Glushets.

Unfortunately such cases are not rare. There are many Army and Navy finance personnel who neglect their duties and the main thing is that they do not share the concerns of the command in training highly classed specialists. They do not strive for Army and Navy warrant officer professional growth through timely material compensation.

"I was not paid for 2nd Class for a whole year and now I'm not getting paid for 1st Class. I have gone to the finance service several times but nothing has changed," Warrant Officer V. Kuznetsov wrote the editor.

It would seem that recalling his service obligation Captain A. Shermanov would have investigated Warrant Officer Kuznetsov's request long ago but he did this only after ZNAMENOSSETS appealed to the next higher finance office. And finance officers V. Ponomarenko and A. Ryabtsev found themselves in a similar situation when the editor sent the complaints from Warrant Officers V. Denev and O. Bagrin to the military districts' finance services and the corresponding resolutions cropped up. The magazine helped Warrant Officer Chechenkin who is serving in the Baltic. And there are many such examples.

And what turns Army and Navy warrant officers who are class specialists into "walkers" who haunt (and often without results) the thresholds of headquarter offices?

People correctly say, "Someone who wants to do something looks for a way but someone who doesn't want to do something looks for an excuse". Yet one doesn't have to look for an excuse. There are enough of them. As a rule discrepancies in payments for rank arise because documents are incorrectly prepared. For example, the unit gets an extract of an order and it incorrectly gives the warrant officer's military training specialty and the name is misspelled. Finance personnel are fault-finders since they guard the state's money and when

they discover an inaccuracy they stop payment for the rank. This is certainly the easiest thing to do. They need additional correspondence to correct the error and this is unnecessary trouble for them. Some finance personnel hide behind a paragraph in the instructions, at times escaping the applicant with a simple promise like, "We will look into it".

Officials in the applicants' own regiment are often the people guilty of making the errors which cause the documents to be returned. For example reserve Warrant Officer V. Volkov sent the editor an answer that he received from a unit commander. He was told, "you were not awarded the class qualification 'master' because you were not included on the order. Former subunit commander Major A. Pakhomov was responsible for this." Because of Major A. Tsapayev and Senior Lieutenant N. Zalogin Warrant Officer G. Tatsiy was also not included on an order and did not receive his classification. Consequently he did not receive the compensation. And, although he put Warrant Officer Ye. Boishtyan on the list, the chief of staff's assistant, Captain A. Yakovlev, gave the incorrect military registration specialty. This again required the intervention of the magazine's editor to correct the situation.

One question comes up. Do finance workers have to wait for reminders or some indication from higher in order to complete their service obligation, being guided not only by the letter of the instruction but also by their own conscience? One would think not.

Our Army and Navy are traditionally strong in military comradeship which is not only shown in critical situations but also in everyday life. The service responsibility of a finance worker is to attentively check a document written up in a unit, correcting errors in what they receive at the headquarters and in a word, showing both regulatory and comradely care for his brother soldier. This is the real way to escape many of the complaints that come in to the magazine editor in regards to non-payment of rank classification compensation.

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Punishment Changed

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) pp 18-19

[From the "Reader-Magazine-Reader" section]

[Text] Warrant Officer V. Bibil used his personal automobile every day when suddenly he found out from one of his comrades that servicemen are forbidden to come to work in personal vehicles. "That can't be," he thought, surprised. "Who other than the GAI [State Automobile Inspection] has the right to forbid me to drive my vehicle? And they can do it only if the vehicle is in disrepair. I violated no vehicular driving regulations..." The next morning he was behind the wheel as usual and received a reprimand.

The Warrant Officer wrote ZNAMENOSETS, asking, "How can this be?" The editor was also surprised and asked the appropriate officials in the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District to investigate the obvious misunderstanding.

The answer was unexpected. "The unit commander who received the directive from higher headquarters acted according to its instructions."

The editor sent a second letter to the district, reminding them that by their actions the unit command structure was violating the constitutional right of a citizen of the USSR. And the answer was the same. "The commander of the military unit.... is acting correctly."

The editor went to the procurator's office for help. Of course the unit order and the corresponding directive were eliminated as they were contrary to the law. And the reprimand given to Warrant Officer Bibik was removed. But another thing comes to mind. Did the appropriate officials not know that the actions of the unit command group and also the directive were contrary to Soviet laws?

And also, maintaining firm regulatory order by using non-regulation methods, regardless of how good the motives prompting it, never brings success. A commander of any rank must serve as an example in irreproachably fulfilling the requirements of Soviet laws and military regulations.

The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum again reminded communists of the necessity for supporting law and order in the country. This party requirement also totally applies to military cadre.

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Warrant Officer Reinstated

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 19

[From the "Reader-Magazine-Reader" section]

[Text] "My husband reserve Warrant Officer A.F. Seminenko served as a submariner for six years. The command commended him numerous times for his service successes. After returning from a long cruise he committed a misdemeanor and was discharged into the reserves ahead of schedule. Unfortunately the senior chief who gave the order for my husband's punishment and discharge didn't take the time to investigate the matter thoroughly and as a result one of the best specialists in the unit was 'thrown overboard'. Is it really possible to get some other punishment if he is guilty?" The editor received this letter from Ol'ga Nikolayevna Seminenko.

At our request this letter was reviewed by the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate Captain 1st Rank A. Korovin informed the editor that Warrant Officer A. Seminenko was given ten days arrest and confinement in the garrison guardhouse for a disciplinary misdemeanor. After the punishment, by order of the senior commander the warrant officer was discharged to the reserves ahead of time for the same disciplinary violation. This is a violation of Article 91 of the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Code which forbids the imposition of several sentences for one and the same violation. Warrant Officer Seminenko had a good record during his service, was a petty officer of a team and a

Specialist 1st Class who had been commended by the command 19 times. In the year preceeding the misdemeanor he had made three long cruises. Considering this the commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet revoked the earlier order discharging the warrant officer into the reserves and at the present time Comrade Seminenko is continuing to serve.

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Investigation Completed

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun) p 19

[From the "Reader-Magazine-Reader" section]

[Text] Warrant Officer Grachev reported to the editor that he was held financially responsible for 2 lost fur jackets without any grounds, that the investigation was conducted superficially, but determined the real culprit in the loss.

The editor sent a complaint to the military procurator with a request that he verify the correctness of applying the "Regulations On Financial Responsibility Of Servicemen In Losses Suffered By The State" in Grachev's case.

Recently ZNAMENOSETS received yet another letter from Warrant Officer Grachev. "The military procurator investigated the circumstances fully and justice triumphed," he reported. "The order for deducting the money was revoked and the sum illegally held from me was returned. The reprimand was also removed. I sincerely thank the magazine's editor and the employees of the military procurator's office for their attention and specific help."

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Travel Reimbursed

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 19

[From the "Reader-Magazine-Reader" section]

[Text] After recovering in a hospital Warrant Officer I. Bardukov was granted convalescent leave. It was recommended that he take a short trip. The travel documents weren't ordered in the unit headquarters and he had to fly at his own expense. The warrant officer wrote, "Since the illness was properly documneted, I was assured that travel expenses to my leave site would be paid, but it didn't turn out that way." We showed this letter to the chief of military travel for the Red Banner Turkistan Military District, Colonel V. Grebennikov, and he reported that Warrant Officer Bardukov's complaint was reviewed. The unit commander where Warrant Officer Bardukov is serving was ordered to pay the money for the serviceman's round trip to his leave site.

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Irregular, Improper Training Cited

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun) p 19

[From the "Reader-Magazine-Reader" section]

[Text] Warrant Officers Khotchenkov, Misnikov, Sukhov and others turned to the editor because exercises in military and political training were irregularly conducted in their unit. And when conducted they were held at a low organizational and methodological level without training aids. They also indicated that personnel don't really know the requirements of the orders and directives from the Minister of Defense and the training program. Other deficiencies were also listed in the letter.

Major General V. Komarov informed the editor that many facts noted in the letter from the group of warrant officers were confirmed. Exercises for them and for military engineers were actually held irregularly. Orders from the Minister of Defense and other commanders and chiefs addressed to the officer corps and warrant officers were not totally followed. Decisive measures are being taken now to eliminate the noted deficiencies.

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Service Extension Discussed

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 19

[From the "You Asked, We Are Answering" section]

[text] Warrant Officer Vorob'yev writes, "I have served as a Warrant Officer for ten years. Can I make a written commitment to extend my service for four years? At the headquarters where I applied the answer was that I could take an obligation for three or five years but not for four. Is this so?"

According to the provisions for military service, Army and Navy warrant officers in the USSR Armed Forces can extend their tour of active military service as a warrant officer voluntarily for no less than three years each time. Consequently you can commit yourself for a tour extension of four years or some other amount.

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Discharge To Reserves Questioned

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 19

[From the "You Asked, We Are Answering" section]

[Text] Warrant Officer V. Yeremenko is 44 years old and has 25 years of service. You want us to explain whether you can be discharged to the reserves.

The discharge of Army and Navy warrant officers from active duty into the reserves is done according to length of service of the tour of service regardless of age if the subsequent voluntary obligation has elapsed and they don't wish to extend it anymore.

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Retirement Leave Authorized

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 19

[From the "You Asked, We Are Answering" section]

[Text] Warrant Officer K. Nariyev, you want to know if you have a right to take regular leave in your retirement year or will it be granted after the transfer to the reserves.

In the year an individual is discharged to the reserves he is paid a monetary sum for unused leave at 1/12 the monthly compensation rate for basic duty and military rank for each full month of service.

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Female Wants Warrant Rank

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 19

[From the "You Asked, We Are Answering" section]

[Text] I am Private L. Yelagina and I have served as a senior headquarters clerk for four years. I want to go to warrant officer school to train for either the staff worker specialty or administrative service. Is this possible?

According to the existing regulations women are not trained in Army and Navy Warrant Officer schools. The military rank of Army and Navy warrant officer is awarded an individual based on age, education and whether the cadre requires the corresponding specialty.

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CSO: 1801/407

ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Letters to Editor Surveyed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 84 p 2

[Article: "'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' MAIL"]

[Text] The editors received 10,125 letters in July 1984. Of them, 541 were published in the newspaper. Five-hundred fifty responses to articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA were received.

This letter arrived from the Baltic Military District. Its author, Junior Sergeant S. Vorontsov, writes: "I serve in an excellent subunit. Things are well with us. But then, why doesn't a sense of concern and dissatisfaction leave me? The Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations recommended intensifying attention to advanced experience and thoroughly studying and introducing it into practice in a well-thought-out manner. And how are things concerning this with us? There are leaders in the competition in the company. We are concerned that their knowledge and skills become the property of the young replacements. But another company is billeted in the same barracks with us, on the second floor--our competitors in training. However, we know little of our neighbors' achievements. One day follows another, and we never find the time to exchange experience in combat training and troop indoctrination. And there are things which we can learn from one another."

There are many letters in the editor's mail which are imbued with concern for further improvement in combat skill. Our readers, Captain-Lieutenant B. Orlov, Senior Lieutenants S. Yemel'yanov and V. Kolesnikov, and many others report that the men are striving to accomplish completely the socialist obligations which have been assumed. At the same time, letters also discuss the necessity for a more thrifty attitude toward training time and the active participation of party and Komsomol organizations in socialist competition, in military indoctrination, and in implementing the requirements of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement in party leadership of the Komsomol and raising its role in the communist indoctrination of the youth," and the recommendations of the Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations.

An analysis of the editor's mail shows that the high patriotic enthusiasm of the men in training was caused by active preparations in the Armed Forces for the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Meetings with former frontline fighters and their recollections of mortal battles with the enemy teach vigilance, love for the socialist motherland, and a hatred for imperialism. Officer A. Kobin from Blagoveshchensk tells warmly about one such meeting:

"These days a council of war veterans created with the garrison Officers' House is conducting active military-patriotic work among the youth of the Amur region oblast center. It is directed by a participant in the heroic Stalingrad struggle, the assault crossing of the Dneiper, and the assault on Königsberg, Colonel (Reserve) I. Nechayev. On lessons conducted by veterans the youths of the city become familiar with combat equipment and weapons and meet with cadets of the military schools. And a recent guest of the young Far Easterners and the men of the garrison was a native of this kray, Hero of the Soviet Union G. Gubkin. His recollections of the fiery war years left no one indifferent."

The exploit of the frontline fighters is great and eternal. Our passionate gratitude to the people who won the victory will never run short. Even today, they are not in reserve, but where the human personality is improved, where character is molded, and where the traditions of courage and loyalty are handed down from generation to generation. In their letters, and there are many of them in the editor's mail, the veterans express their burning gratitude to the party and the government for their tireless concern for them. But in the stream of letters, once in a while a message of hard-heartedness and indifference toward a very worthy person is encountered. Here are some lines from the letter of a veteran of the war and labor, A. Maystrenko: "I live on the Proletarskiy sovkhov [state farm] in the Ryazan region. My youth was spent on the frontline roads--as a driver I delivered ammunition to the forward troops. I was awarded the medal 'For Combat Services.' Exchanging the soldier's service shirt for the worker's blouse, I plunged into sovkhov matters. And I did not notice how a quarter of a century flew by in concerns about the land and the harvest. I am now 65 years old. I am on a pension. Why am I writing you? Well, because I have been forgotten by the sovkhov management. No one is interested in how I, an old woman, lift a bundle of wood to the second floor. How it is difficult to heat the stove and go down to a distant well for water. And how I need human interest and attention."

This story reminds us once again how impermissible spiritual hard-heartedness and indifference are in relation to people who have deserved nationwide love and recognition.

Discipline Tightened After Article

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 84 p 2

[Article: "The Subject Is Important, But..."]

[Text] This was the title of a press survey [The Subject is Important, But...] published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 21 June. It pointed out that in the newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA [Combat Watch] (Red Banner Pacific Fleet) articles on questions connected with the observance of the daily routine in the units and on the ships and with strengthening military discipline often bear a survey, informational, faceless nature. In them there is not a sufficiently deep disclosure of the

specific experience in the struggle of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations for prescribed order.

The editor-in-chief of the newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA, Captain 1st Rank S. Pryazhevskiy, reported: the survey correctly points out serious shortcomings in the newspaper's activity in illuminating subjects connected with the accomplishment of the ship's daily routine. Also correct is the statement concerning the facelessness of critical remarks in some editorials, concerning the absence of references to specific instances in them, and concerning the fact that the newspaper writes about the ship's routine and the necessity for its accomplishment with long time intervals.

The press survey, "The Subject is Important, But...", was discussed by the editorial board of BOYEVAYA VAKHTA. It required all department chiefs to have a more exacting attitude toward the editing of materials for the newspaper. To eliminate shortcomings noted in the survey, the necessary corrections have been introduced in the long-range plan for dealing with questions of strengthening discipline and, in particular, of observing the daily routine in units and on ships. The editorial board approved the subject matter for articles planned for the near future which have been worked out in the departments of combat and physical training, aviation, and information.

The questions raised in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA press survey were also discussed at a party meeting in the editorial office of the newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA.

Kronshtadt Memorial Preservation Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 84 p 2

[Article: "In Debt to History"]

[Text] A report which discussed shortcomings in protecting memorials to history and culture in the city of Kronshtadt was published under this heading [In Debt to History] on 3 July. As reported to the editors by Captain 1st Rank G. Yakovlev, the newspaper article was considered by the command and political department. The criticism expressed in the report was acknowledged to be correct.

In accordance with a plan approved by the Leningrad city soviet executive committee, in 1985 the "Restavrator" [Restorer] association will continue work in the building of the seamen's club. Its completion is envisaged in 1987.

This year, defects and imperfections will be eliminated in the work being accomplished in the Summer Garden. Repair of the roof of the former Moscow Arsenal is planned for 1984-1985.

The command and political department together with party and soviet organs examined questions of the maintenance and repair of buildings which are under the protection of the state and belonging to the base.

A plan for the repair of memorials for the years 1985-1990 has been worked out jointly with the Leningrad city soviet executive committee.

Commanders and chiefs under whose jurisdiction buildings of historical value are found and the management of the base's sea engineering service and capital construction have been strictly warned about their personal responsibility for the preservation and maintenance of these buildings.

Subunit's Ideological Work Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Aug 84 p 2

[Article: "They Dressed a Lie in Paper"]

[Text] The critical report by Major N. Belan was published under this heading [They Dressed a Lie in Paper] in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 18 May. It told about serious shortcomings in the organization of ideological and mass political work in the air defense subunit where Captain N. Vetokhin is the political deputy. As reported to the editors by the member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Air Defense District, Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Ponomarev, the newspaper article was discussed in the political directorate, in the political departments of units and large units, and at assemblies of organic propagandists. A group of officers from the political directorate headed by the chief of the Department for Propaganda and Agitation, the deputy chief of the district's political directorate, Colonel V. Morozov, was sent to the units of the large unit and it made a detailed study of the local state of affairs. The officers of the political directorate also rendered effective assistance to command and political personnel and party and Komsomol activists in eliminating the shortcomings indicated by the newspaper. The subunit's political deputy, Captain N. Vetokhin, was held disciplinarily responsible and responsible along party lines. He was warned of incomplete official compliance and the party commission with the unit political department issued him a severe reprimand. The regiment's propagandist, Major N. Kurnayev, received disciplinary and party punishment. As regards the chief of the regiment's political department, Major Yu. Khromov, in view of his short stay in the post it was decided to be limited to a reprimand. The chief of the higher political organ was heard at a session of the district's military council. The political directorate plans to discuss the status and ways for further improvement of ideological and mass political work at forthcoming assemblies of political organ chiefs of large units and units and at seminars of secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations.

Military Commissariat Call-Up Errors

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Aug 84 p 2

[Letter to editors by V. Semidetova: "Tenth Notice"]

[Text] You are being written by the mother of two draftees--Nikolay and Vladimir Semidetov. My sons have been adjudged suitable for military service and, in accordance with entries in their service records, were subject to call-up this spring.

I live in Nikolayev and my sons worked in Maykop, Krasnodar kray, and they should be called up for service by the Adyge oblast military commissariat. Nikolay and

Vladimir were warned of their forthcoming call-up and they went on leave in early spring. And then notices poured in from the military commissariat: dated 8 May, 15 May, 20 May, 4 June, 20 June, 26 June.... Ten of them accumulated. As is proper in such cases, my sons left their jobs and received their severance pay. They had also spent several days at the draft office in Krasnodar. But each time...they returned emptyhanded.

How can such a misunderstanding be explained? I turned for an answer to the Adyge oblast military commissariat. They reassured me: my sons would be sent to a unit on 26 June. But they returned from the draft office on that day, too. Again someone had erred. And errors of this type bring me, the mother of a family with many children, much nervousness: my grown sons have not worked for three months. These mistakes are costing the state dearly: Nikolay and Vladimir worked at the Maykop Friendship plant and provided needed food products for people. I am confident that the call-up of the youth for military service should be a celebration for the youths and their parents....

V. Semidetova

From the editors: We contacted the Adyge deputy oblast military commissar, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kapran, by telephone and we learned that the call-up of the Semidetov brothers has been put off until the fall. But why did such serious errors in the work of the military commissariat become possible?

Officer's Incompetence Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Medvedev, Red Banner Ural Military District "A Little Smoke Over the Bathhouse"]

[Text] "Major V. Shcherbakov, the chief of the training center where we are serving, is rude and sharp with his subordinates. He is virtually uninvolved in the training and indoctrination of the personnel: all his time is spent on trips to neighboring enterprises and the "reception" of important people. For meetings with them a bathhouse has been built above which a little smoke constantly appears. Frequently Major Shcherbakov's efforts are directed toward ensuring his personal well-being."

(From a letter to the editor by
Warrant Officer [praporshchik V.
Kulinovskiy

"Major Shcherbakov is a leader with initiative, enterprising, and demanding. Unfortunately, he is a little abrupt in handling his subordinates. I do not believe that he can use his official status for personal goals...."

(From a talk by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent with Colonel N. Tsybulenko--Major V. Shcherbakov's immediate superior.)

As we see, the opinions do not coincide. What is the truth?

This January, the editors had already received a letter about the rudeness and arbitrariness of the training center chief. In accordance with its request, the facts were checked by personnel of the district's political directorate. Major V. Shcherbakov was warned about the impermissibility of rudeness in his relations with subordinates. He received no punishment. It so happened that at precisely that time demonstration lessons had taken place on a good level in the training center.

After being summoned to the political department of the large unit and a comradely warning, the chief of the training center changed his work style for a while. He became stricter toward himself and more tactful in handling subordinates. And now, here is a new letter to the editors. A tribute to the past? Or did the officer return to his accustomed methods?

It turned out that Major Shcherbakov again began to break loose. In which regard, more frequently than formerly. One day, for example, he issued instructions to Warrant Officer [praporshchik] S. Nabiulin, the chief of the tank moving-target firing range, to turn some of the rails over to another sector, which was done. But when there were not enough rails to equip the range, Shcherbakov came down on Nabiulin with swearing.

Warrant Officer V. Kulikovskiy received a dressing down for a different reason, but again, without basis. During a check firing on the moving target firing range for infantry combat vehicles, a relay box malfunctioned. Warrant Officer V. Shchetinin, who was responsible for the sector, turned to Kulikovskiy for assistance. The latter did not refuse the request and replaced the box. The firings were continued. Warrant Officer Kulikovskiy never expected that the display of regular military mutual assistance would cause the chief's anger.

We must relate in greater detail the circumstances under which Major Shcherbakov cursed Warrant Officer I. Zrazhevskiy coarsely. They are connected with the bathhouse mentioned in the letter.

When it was decided to build their bathhouse in the training center and, what is more, with a steam room, there was no limit to the personnel's rejoicing. The reaction was natural. The training center is intense heat and frost, dust, and work with technical equipment. And one could properly wash only in the city--and the road there is at a distance.

Major Shcherbakov decided to build the bathhouse on the yard for farming, but by no means an ordinary one. In the bathhouse, a place was found for a spacious room with a fireplace for resting. A refrigerator, cabinet with dishes, and a television set were installed as was a telephone. What was all this for? It was not difficult to guess. "Important people" became constant guests of Major Shcherbakov in the evenings. The bathhouse became the main place of service for Sergeant S. Pokus. He maintains the optimum temperature in the steam room, changes the water in the pool which is faced with tile in short supply, carries out empty bottles....

The chief of the training center was courteous and attentive with his guests. All he had to do was leave the bathhouse, and the officer would not be recognized. He was ready to insult anyone. Warrant Officer Zrazhevskiy also found himself in such a situation. Major Shcherbakov demanded that he bring to the bathhouse meat for shashlik, bread, sugar, and so forth. "Bring" meant to take from the mess hall. The warrant officer tactfully reminded him that this is reflected in the norms of the soldier ration. Here, too, the chief of the center demonstrated his character.

Just who bathed in this luxurious "range" bath on that ill-fated evening for Zharevskiy? Colonel N. Tsybulenko. It was he who, in a talk with the correspondent, doubted that Major Shcherbakov, his subordinate, is capable of using his official position for personal goals and, in one way or another, he connected his rudeness and abruptness with demandingness and with strict service demands.

It was difficult for Comrade Tsybulenko to be principled and objective. At one time his wife was delivered to her place of work regularly by the training center's vehicle transport (the duty officer was appointed the vehicle commander), and Tsybulenko's personal vehicle was stored in one of the warehouses intended, naturally, for other purposes. Details? Perhaps. But they also erode principles.

And the fact that Major Shcherbakov confuses the official with the personal is no secret. For example, his subordinates assembled a garage for him from metal sections which were in the warehouse. But according to documents, the sections had allegedly been expended on the needs of the shop. Shcherbakov cleverly made use of scrap metal which had been collected on the training fields. It was intended to turn it over to "Vtorchermet" [State Trust for Procurement and Re-processing Used Ferrous Metals] from the troop unit. But the officer turned it over in the name of "Sel'khoztekhnika" [Agricultural Equipment Association], for which his kindness was returned with a new body for his Moskvich. Wood was also cut up in the training center for a picket fence for one of the local enterprises, and also not without compensation..

I am confident: Major Shcherbakov's behavior is determined to a great extent by the unscrupulousness of his immediate superior, Colonel N. Tsybulenko, who persistently does not interfere in the deeds of his subordinate who is blameworthy in nothing. The little smoke from the bathhouse interferes.

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GROUND FORCES

UNIT CRITICIZED FOR POOR MOTOR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 11

[Article by Colonel S. Potashov, ZNAMENOSSETS correspondent: "Neither Headlights Nor Parking Lights"]

[Text] Inspecting the condition of automotive equipment in a maintenance subunit caused more and more gloom. Rear view mirrors had been removed and windshield wiper holders unscrewed in the almost new ZIL's. The officer didn't even hope to find parking light and stop light covers in place and as he thought, they were missing. Many components and mechanisms under the hood were also missing. A radiator cap couldn't be found and the oil level couldn't be checked because the oil stick was missing.

And the inspector, completing his equipment inspection and filling a notebook with new observations, said, "And the maintenance personnel -- how do they intend to 'doctor' other units' vehicles when they cannot do their own? Or are they following the old practice that the shoemaker's wife is always the worst shod?"

It would seem that the unsatisfactory evaluation that the commission gave on the condition of equipment would be a ChP [extraordinary event] requiring the unit to take extreme measures. However a week went by and then another and now their time was actually up. We walked to the vehicle park with Captain A. Shinkarenko whose duty assignment made him the one responsible for the vehicles. Even from far away it was apparent that the parking lights that had not been on the vehicles were still missing and one of the vehicles was even missing headlights.

The officer forestalled the question by saying, "We got headlights and will install them tomorrow or the day after. We are repairing all the light signals at the same time, but we are simply short of time."

But what if everything had been organized like this! At random we opened cabs and hoods, and what do you think we found? There were no light terminals, an ignition socket was empty ...

"We are putting all the parts on the vehicles in the near future," Captain Shinkarenko assured us. "A man has already gone for spare parts."

Well, most likely the situation will be straightened out, but I couldn't shake this thought. Did they really have to wait for the commission to come? And as generally happens, some vehicles were not even ready to move. Was someone responsible for them?

"They are assigned to Senior Warrant Officer V. Serbin and Warrant Officer N. Trelin," explained subunit commander Captain M. Il'in. "But they are not really at fault for this. They try with all their might to both service and guard the equipment but the parking area is open and anyone who wants can come in it and work."

"And perhaps the equipment isn't under guard?"

"It certainly is."

In adding details about the poor performance by the twenty-four hour guard service and the poor organization of the park itself, Warrant Officer Trelin repeated the officer's report almost word for word. "It isn't necessary to make up trifling details. There isn't even a place to wash a vehicle," he complained. "And there is really nowhere to work on the equipment, you can't break away in the park."

In a later conversation with the warrant officer he additionally complained that there weren't enough spare parts and nowhere to get them, senior commanders weren't concerned about the subunit's vehicles and the work day was overloaded.

To listen to these people one might well deeply sympathize with them, as if they were leaning over backwards, concerned about the vehicles but unable to get the problem moving off of dead center. True, when you glance at the wheels thickly smeared with dirt and the cabs' rusted facing, you automatically wonder if the specialists themselves were without sin.

So as not to jump to conclusions we went to the adjacent parking area and literally into a different park. The vehicles there were clean and cared for. Even the ZIP [spare parts, tool and accessory kits] were complete. There wasn't a mark of corrosion, although the storage conditions were the same. You connected the batteries, put on the ignition and off you went.

"What kind of mark did the commission give the subunit for the condition of equipment?"

"Good," answered Captain N. Sogomonov and added with regret in his voice, "we didn't reach 'outstanding' because we hadn't touched up the paint on the wheel drums and some other minor things hadn't been done to standard. We had planned to do them later."

"And when did you get the vehicles in order?"

"They always look this way," the officer said with a faint note of offense. "We are accustomed to protecting our equipment."

This good habit had been developed a long time ago in Captain Sogomonov's unit and it certainly didn't come about all by itself. It developed thanks to the commander's uncompromising exactingness. He considers the care of vehicles a paramount mission of every soldier, a mission that must be completed under all conditions, even if it means foregoing personal time.

By the way, as practice shows, nothing has to be sacrificed. It is enough not to lose the feeling of responsibility and to work during vehicle park and park-economy days with a purposeful and carefully thought-out plan. And this is the way it was done. The commander himself, on whom everyone naturally aligns, wasn't afraid to get his hands dirty. This is why all preventive work on the equipment is done in a timely manner here. No one ever thinks about putting one required operation off until later. It just isn't done.

As was revealed, the poor condition of the vehicles in the maintenance subunit was also caused by habit. But this was a habit of another kind, flowing with the tide.

These vehicles hadn't gotten to look the way they did overnight. It turned out that almost a year ago something had happen to them and a great number of mechanisms that had quit were taken out to be replaced several months ago. But they had not been replaced. And the rest was the natural result of negligence and laziness by these same specialists. For example, maybe the problem was taking a bucket or two of water to the stand to wash the vehicle. Was it necessary to wait for some special order to take basic measures to protect the metal against corrosion?

There were many things that showed that the maintenance workers seldom had the urge to work with the equipment. For the last six months they had been reproached at every service meeting and at one conference the party buro specially heard Communist M. Il'in who promised to make every effort to eliminate deficiencies.

But apparently neither the subunit commander himself nor his two closest assistants, Communist Serbin and non-party member Trelin, were in any hurry to make the effort. They chose a very handy position in that they hid their own inertness by pointing out the flaws of others.

"You say that maintenance people are complaining about the shortage of time for servicing equipment," bitterly smiled political worker Officer F. Kuznetsov, "but didn't they confess that they had to be driven to the park almost by force? Didn't they recall that there was frequently more conversation than action alongside the vehicles? You see, they talked about this and that for a while, grumbled some about the disorder in the park and their workday was over."

"But there is a lot of truth to what they say."

"I'm not arguing. The park area has long needed radical improvement. Some steps were planned but they were clearly not enough. And everything doesn't depend on us."

"And what about spare parts for the vehicles?"

"Captain Shinkarenko undoubtedly bears the brunt of the guilt in this area. He is late with demands and isn't efficient in delivering spare parts. He was punished by the party for this. I think that he will accept the blame from the communists in the proper manner. I can add that in my opinion henceforth no one will have this problem with equipment conditions or maintenance personnel. I confess that I myself did not know that things were so bad. Indeed, you rely on the commander's words."

A laudable trait of political officers is to teach people trust, but apparently it is still too early to approach everyone with this lofty measure. One should not forget this popular wisdom: "trust, but check".

Well organized military technical propaganda and primarily the dissemination of the experience of the foremost subunits in caring for vehicles could do its major bit to keep vehicular equipment at a high level of combat readiness. Such experience is accumulated in subunits but for some reason is not widely publicized.

As is known, military technical propaganda offers more than just a certain sum of knowledge. It imparts to specialists a feeling of responsibility and indoctrinates in them a love for the vehicles entrusted to them. And when the duties of a soldier are reinforced with the responsibilities for the business entrusted to him and the love for that business, then no misunderstandings with equipment can come up. It will always be ready for use and on the way to serve truth and right.

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GROUND FORCES

LIVE-FIRE TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS OUTLINED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) pp 14-15

[Article by Colonel N. Naydin, Main Ground Force Military Training Directorate: "Target Reconnaissance"]

[Text] Exercises which teach skills in operating with weapons, scouting targets, determining the range to them and independently resolving fire missions and developing confidence in one's own weapons are the basic methods for training personnel in fire preparation. The development of preparatory exercises plays a major role in this.

These preparatory exercises are developed during the training period and elaborated each month and the number of fire missions in an exercise depends on the number of targets subject to being destroyed.

In each preparatory exercise the chief instructor determines the number and type of targets, the range to them, the time they are to be exposed, the sequence for illuminating and simulating their fire at night, the direction and speed of movement, etc. He also develops several variations for target exposure so that the targets come up in a new sequence and at different ranges for each change of students and during repeat exercises.

The targets at which students shoot live ammunition are set out at realistic ranges, but for small caliber ammunition the ranges are reduced. The sizes of the targets used are also proportionally reduced in the latter case.

To train students to shoot on the move and from the short halt it is best to have the targets appear for each shooter at two or three positions 100-150 meters apart (see schematic). This allows a range change from one shot to the next.

At the chief instructor's discretion these skills can be developed by various means and the Marksmanship Course specifies the appropriate exercises. As a rule one method for target designation is worked on in an exercise and the chief instructor introduces the soldiers first to the simplest, visual estimation.

A platoon in foxholes or combat vehicles is ordered to identify targets by their appearance and then, using generally known distances between local

features (for example, between telegraph poles) to determine the range to them.


The platoon works up the target designation as a squad from emplacements equipped with firing foxholes. The students must explain the rules for searching for targets using reference points (terrain features), from a conventional direction (the direction of fire) and so forth. Here they should be shown how to give a target designation by using a gun position indicator or the azimuth scale of a vision device.

Before setting out to complete the more complicated exercises in scouting targets and determining ranges to them by angular rates or by using a range finder scale in a vision device the chief instructor should remind the soldiers of the target's linear measurement (height and width) and repeat with them the angular value of improvised materials and of instruments and observation device scales.

Automatic riflemen, machine gunners and grenadiers complete this exercise with their own squads. They must have their organic weapons, binoculars and improvised materials (a drill round, pencil, matches etc). Combat vehicle crews use aiming and observation devices. On vehicles with range finders, the chief instructor reinforces specialists' skills by working with these devices after he critiques the actions of the soldiers.

The chief instructor must keep in mind that when using visual estimation to determine range and when using aiming-range finder instruments, targets are shown at their normal size, but when using target angular rate targets are reduced in size.

Moving targets are placed on carts of overpasses. They can be designated by targets of military equipment (frontal and lateral configurations) and mounted on an automobile (see the schematic). Bilateral communications are set up to



coordinate the actions of the chief instructor and the man in charge of the automobile (the driver).

After verifying that objects on the target field are operational the chief instructor introduces the tactical situation to the students, indicates the reference points and the character of the enemy's operations, the position to be scouted, sectors of observation and the sequence for reporting. After the students receive the mission and take up the indicated positions the chief instructor gives the command, "Begin the reconnaissance of targets", at which time the operator begins displaying targets and the students start to recon them.

The students record all the information and report it to the chief instructor. He needs this so that he can give a detailed critique and an objective evaluation. The marksmanship course authorizes the chief instructor to make various additions and changes to exercises conditions and also to develop new ones according to the students' level of training.

After the students understand the methods for scouting targets and determine the ranges to them the chief instructor begins to develop preparatory fire exercises.

As a rule automatic weapons are fired using a single round. This includes firing the machine guns mounted on combat vehicles. For example, three rounds are authorized when firing from the kneeling position to hit a target at close range. When the range is increased, the chief instructor can give one additional round for each 100 meters beyond close range.

During the time the target is displayed the student must detect the target and fire the number of aimed shots required to hit it. It is therefore advisable to begin the target display 10-20 seconds after the shooter occupies his firing position.

If the exercise consists of several fire missions the rating for completing the exercise is determined by the following: hitting all targets -- "excellent"; hitting no less than two-thirds -- "good"; hitting no less than one-half -- "satisfactory". When the exercise consists of only one target the rating depends on the number of times the target is hit.

Here are a few words on the location for the exercise. Exercises using live ammunition from infantry weapons, light anti-tank weapons, automatic rocket launchers and infantry combat vehicle and tank guns as a rule are held on combat firing ranges and artillery training schools. Exercises using small caliber rounds are conducted in firing ranges and local training areas.

Exercises must be conducted such that the soldiers learn to set the initial data quickly. When the student opens fire on the target (simulates firing provisional rounds) the chief instructor controls his actions. When the target is hit, he indicates another target.

A soldier's readiness to complete more complicated fire missions is determined by the results of the completed exercise. The successful completion of preparatory exercises allows the soldier to qualitatively complete check firing in the future and accurately hit targets in field firing during tactical training.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

NIGHT INTERCEPT TACTICS IN AERIAL COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 84 p 1

[Article by Captain Z. Mazhidov, military aviator 1st class, Central Group of Forces: "Night Intercepts"]

[Text] This was mock combat. But, we were expected to act as if it were real. No concessions--no allowances for youth--would be made in evaluating the artillery and tactical training of Senior Lieutenants V. Kuchkin, N. Chernov and A. Samasyuk. These officers were going after a high-level skill rating--1st class. I had been designated the "enemy" for their combat exercises: a link commander must be aware of every "plus" and "minus" in the aerial training of his subordinates.

Prior to takeoff, the officers got together near the aircraft of Sr Lt S. Yushinov. They were seeking answers and advice from the veteran flyer. Yushinov finds time to share his knowledge with the airmen. This skilled technician senses his own involvement in the work which they must do in the air. Sometimes, I look at him and am reminded of the breed of technician that was common on the front lines during the war, one of whom was quite convincingly portrayed, in my opinion, by the actor Aleksey Smirnov in the film, "'Old Men' Go Into Battle Alone." They bring similar attitudes to their work. How much effort and love Yushinov invests in the training of aviation technicians! How much he is willing to go through for an airman to see that he carries out his mission!

The first of Yushinov's trainees to lift off in his missile-carrier was Sr Lt Samasyuk. I have great respect for his sound judgement, cool-headedness and composure. He is outstanding in the theoretical aspects of his training. He tends to look for innovative tactical measures for use in combat. His actions in the air are strictly controlled, logical and precise.

Sr Lt's Kuchkin and Chernov lifted into the night sky shortly after him.

The night was marked by difficult weather conditions. I imagined myself in the position of the interceptors. The cloud deck reaches 7000 meters. The sheer massiveness of the night seems to press in on you. These feelings are not present during daytime. But, at night, as you penetrate the clouds, you feel the minutes pass--one minute, two minutes, three... When!? What is a minute on the

ground? It generally passes unnoticed. But, now, it seems as if time has stood still. Instrument lights reflect from the cockpit canopy, and the aircraft takes on a glowing halo from its own navigation lights and the afterburner flames reflecting off nearby clouds. The feeling produced by this is not a pleasant one--it is like being under a huge incandescent lamp globe.

Yesterday, possible alternatives for conducting target intercepts were discussed with Sr Lt Chekodanov, a combat control officer. Chekodanov heard requests that intercept conditions be made to approximate actual combat as closely as possible, that is, that interceptors be allowed to close with targets at high rates of speed and make use of larger target aspects [radar sighting angles].

"Course... Altitude..." Sr Lt Samasyuk reacts instantaneously to commands from the ground controller.

I try to anticipate the actions of the interceptor. He banks his fighter into a sharp turn, and made ready [as published] for his attack run. At this point, I feel some concern for my young subordinate. In rushing into his attack, he may activate his on-board radar and give himself away. It would then be easy for me to evade his attack. But no, the warning system in my missile-carrier is silent. And now, I myself am beginning to feel uncomfortable sitting in the cockpit of my own fighter--the advantage has swung to the attacker!

In order to deprive the interceptors of this advantage, I climb to a higher altitude--right up to the edge of the stratosphere. Samasyuk had earlier been in the habit of creeping up as close as possible to the target, and then executing a lightening-like climb to the target's altitude. At medium-range altitudes, this tactic was successful. But, in the stratosphere, the youthful flyer failed to take into account his missile-carrier's inertia, and, without a radar sighting on the target, he zoomed past it and put himself in a position to be attacked by the "enemy." How will he handle himself this time?

I make conjectures about the interceptor's maneuvers based on commands transmitted by the ground controller. Samasyuk has piloted his aircraft onto the same altitude as mine. This means he has taken account of his past mistake. But why doesn't he turn on his radar? How many kilometers separate us? Could he actually be closing to minimal range? I maneuver sharply to escape from the attack.

The voice of the controller breaks in: "[aircraft number] 27! The target is to the right... Approach the target..."

To my surprise, my attack warning light flashes on. A whining alarm signal comes over the earphones in my helmet, and then the interceptor's voice:

"Fire one! Fire two!"

With the flames of his afterburners slashing through the night darkness, the fighter triumphantly banks away. But, how did it come so suddenly? I no sooner begin to ponder this, when I reflexively recoil once more from the alarm signal.

"[This is] 31: Mission accomplished!"

I had not seen Sr Lt Kuchkin break away from the attack group. Under the cover of Samasyuk's diversionary tactic, he executed one of the most difficult maneuvers in the manual--intercept using a large target aspect. From a tactical standpoint, the officer displayed a high level of skill, initiative and daring. He is now, as a result, a military aviator 1st class.

One can, it would seem, derive a sense of satisfaction even from defeat. Such is the case when you see that your labors have not been in vain, and that your pupils have become polished combat pilots.

Nor did Sr Lt Chernov let his comrades down. Of course, there was little else he could do but nervously bide his time on the ground, monitoring the radio traffic from the aerial engagement, and waiting for the order to take off. He advised that there is no form of suspense more agonizing. But this airman did not "burnout" on me. I had purposely made it more difficult for him to carry out his mission: I maneuvered with speed changes and varied my flight level. Engaging me by use of a large target aspect, he forced me to increase speed. I was hoping that Chernov would not be able to get a fix on me, and that, as a result, his inertia would take him past me. But, within something like a second, he had overtaken me using his radar predictor. The system locked onto the target as it was designed to, the signals were sent for missile launch, and Chernov repeated the victory report transmitted by his comrades. There was only one thing left for me to do--acknowledge defeat in this night combat exercise, and, after confirming the data through objective checks, award excellent grades to the airmen.

9481

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

COMPETITIONS' ROLE FOR FLIGHT SQUADRONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jul 84 p 1

[Article by Major A. Lukashov, Red Banner Carpathian Military District:
"Reserves of the Squadron"]

[Text] The tactical-flying exercise was held. The plane of the squadron commander, Major M. Vershelis, was one of the first launched into the air. After his many years of service, Vershelis knew well how much the commander's example means to his subordinates. And they took heightened socialist obligations to the period of the tactical-flying exercise--to perform on the ground and in the air with excellent marks.

After gaining altitude the major received the mission to intercept an aerial target. Efficiently executing the command of the combat control officer, he accurately reached the given area on time, succeeded in detecting the target quickly, and carried out a conventional launch on it. The unbiased control apparatus testified that the rocket strike was accurate.

Then Major Vershelis received a new commitment--to strike a ground target. Soon fiery lightning sparkled over the firing range. The subordinates matched the commander. The sniper rocket firings of combat pilots 1st Class Major V. Saprykin and Captain N. Garyachiy, and other aerial fighting men were noted with the gratitude of the senior commander.

It is written in the socialist obligations of the squadron's aviators that by the end of the training year the squadron would be raised to the ranks of the outstanding. Now they are continuing persistently to achieve the intended goal. Recently they began to master an aspect of combat application new to them. And this, as is known, is connected not only with the perfection of practices and changes in operation tactics adopted earlier, but also with reorganizing peoples' psychology. Therefore, the personal example of leaders is particularly important.

The squadron commander and his deputies saw personal example as an important stimulus in raising the activeness of subordinates in socialist competition for attaining the highest results of military work. Besides that, they constantly see to it that in the squadron the motto "worked"--none can be second-best. Somehow the question arose: why was Captain S. Prokopuk not always able to

strike a ground target from a complicated form of maneuver? In the squadron, they analyzed how the aviation flight commander trains subordinates, and found in his methodology definite flaws. Specifically, it was established that he at times displayed unnecessary tutelage of a subordinate, ready in the course of preflight preparation to make nearly all the computations for him. And when the subordinate was in the air, he prompted him there. Thus the pilot was used to prompting. From this indecisiveness and constraint appeared in his actions.

On the recommendation of the unit's methodology council, the experienced instructor Captain N. Garyachiy was commissioned to help Prokopuk eliminate his mistakes. Nikolay Vladimirovich often supervised his activity on the trainer and in the course of fulfilling flying tasks, allowing the pilot still greater independence. Gradually Prokopuk worked out his own confident flying hand.

To show an example, to teach, to bring up one's own skill level--every experienced pilot of the squadron gives himself such a task in the course of competition.

The squadron aviators also found other reserves to raise the effectiveness of socialist competition. Earlier, for example, the winners for the flying session, for the month, etc., were determined now and then without regard to the quality of fulfilling one or another stage of flight tasks. We will say that Major Saprykin from takeoff to landing, in every stage of a training battle, always strives to act energetically, boldly, and with initiative, while his rival in the competition now and then acts listlessly, and does not fully use the maneuver and combat capability of the aircraft, or its weapons. Nonetheless, if both pilots bring back recordings of passing examinations, in the summing up they will receive an identical evaluation.

It is not difficult to understand to what such levelling leads. Several pilots lay out minimal obstacles for themselves--if only to complete the exercise.

A new approach to determining the victors of socialist competition will help to eliminate this flaw. They have started to evaluate pilots' training not only according to the general results of combat action in the air, but also to take into account the "intermediate" indicators, command post data, and means of objective supervision. This immediately introduced a sharpness into the aviators' rivalry, and a striving always to act strenuously and with complete output.

Corrective actions were introduced also in the competition of engineer-aviation service specialists. How was it previously? The best airplane is determined, let us say, in the summing up, and only the name of the combat vehicle mechanic is heard. As if other specialists had not serviced this fighter. Naturally this lowered the enthusiasm for work of those who were continually forgotten. Now every month in the squadron, not only the best pilot and aircraft mechanic are determined, but also specialists in armament, avionics, navigational equipment, etc.

They resolved other problems in the squadron as well. There was a time when the question as to who would compete with whom was decided spontaneously. It

happened, at times, that specialists of unequal experience competed deliberately. One of them, as an example, was an expert in military skills. Another, as it happened, had a rating significantly lower and was short of experience. This meant that his habits were not those of his comrade. It is clear that the victor in such a situation might be determined in advance.

Now, those competing more carefully consider the question as to who will compete with whom, say, in the course of a tactical flying exercise, and during the resolution of some concrete task. They select a constant rival for themselves for a stage of competition, as a rule, from equals. This raises the desire of everyone to attain superiority.

Such an approach to organizing competition will help, as well, squadron aviators from month to month to attain higher results in combat training, which the results of the tactical flying exercise referred to give witness.

12198

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

KUZ'MINA'S BOOK ON A.M. LYUL'KA REVIEWED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 2 Feb 84) p 33

[Review by O. Mukhin, science secretary of the USSR Academy of Science's Leningrad section of aviation and space history, of book "Ognennoye serdtse" [Fiery Heart] by L. M. Kuz'mina, Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1983, 223 pages]

[Text] This is the name of a book about the founder of the first domestic turbo-jet engine, Hero of Socialist Labor and laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes, General Designer, academician A. M. Lyul'ka. The author in fascinating and lively fashion tells about the amazing fate of this talented person.

Arkhip Mikhaylovich Lyul'ka was born in 1908. He grew up and reached manhood together with our country, which opened a wide road to life for each of its citizens and offered the opportunity to realize a very innermost dream. The reader will find in the book not only reliable facts from the life of a foremost scientist and engineer, but also will become acquainted with the history of the creation of air-jet engines of his design.

At the end of the 30's A. Lyul'ka started developing his engine at the Kirov works in Leningrad, and by the start of the Great Patriotic War his prototype was practically ready. Next he successfully tested the combustion chamber. The war changed all the plans. He had to bury the details and drawings right in the factory grounds. Only in the winter of 1942 was Arkhip Mikhaylovich able to return to blockaded Leningrad and bring out his precious "buried treasure" to the rear, where he continued work on the turbo-jet engine.

The book consists of short stories, full of content and united towards a common logical aim. In them he narrates the triumphant path of A. Lyul'ka and the design bureau which he directed. The appearance in those years of jet engines, in the aircraft of foreign countries, presented our industry with the task of developing our own more powerful, faster, and analagous engines with a wide range of potential. The concluding chapters are devoted to the development of the AL-7 engine.

The book reads easily and with interest, and thus may be recommended to a wide circle of readers. But, unfortunately, the author was unable to avoid several inaccuracies. For example, in 1882, A. F. Mozhayskiy was able to construct his

own life-size aircraft but the attempt at flight, despite the allegation of L. Kuz'mina, was unsuccessful. One can read about this in the Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, and also in the works of TsAGI [Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute]. There are other inaccuracies, as well, which lower the general excellent impression of the book.

Despite this, the book "Ognennoye serdtse" will yield unquestionable use to the aviation reader. The design bureau headed by the academician A. Lyul'ka gave birth to the heart of many winged machines. With their help, many world speed and altitude records were established.

12198

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NAVAL FORCES

NON-ADHERENCE TO TRAINING SCHEDULES CRITICIZED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 26 Jun 84) p 9

[Article by Warrant Officer N. Kostenko, Double Red Banner Baltic Fleet:
"According To The Schedule"]

[Text] A training schedule is law for sailors. Where ever the ship may be and what ever the weather conditions, notification to start the next training hour rings out exactly according to the daily routine. There is only this one question. Do they always value the time allotted for increasing combat skills.

The electricians led by Petty Officer 1st Class M. Vinakov were hurrying to the crew's accommodations but it was being used by another team. The petty officer went to find a free area and after about five or ten minutes the sailors were seated in a small compartment where even visual aids couldn't be used at their full size. Of course the quality of training was low.

Here is another example. The break was over but the gunners were still smoking on the forecastle and Petty Officer 1st Class A. Kucherenko was with them. According to the training schedule they were allotted a total of 15 minutes for training on the gun. This was the time needed for the sailors to use practical experience for reinforcing the information they had received.

But the extended smoke break and time lost in searching for documentation and mounting the optical sights ate up almost one third of the time. As a result every third sailor was deprived of the chance for testing his combat work.

Neither Vinakov, who had not earlier specified the location for training, nor Kucherenko, who released training time into the wind along with the tobacco smoke, felt that they had violated the schedule. And neither do the people who instruct subordinates with trite plans and conspects or who for the sake of high marks simplify conditions for completing exercises.

At times the training schedule is violated because of the inexperience of some petty officers, their inability to organize training in full compliance with the concept of the senior commander. It is enough to explain to the junior commander that a schedule is required from him, establish control for preparing for the training and the matter will go on correctly.

The more vital, if one can use that expression, violations are those of another type. Other petty officers begin and end training right on the bell and they have the visual aides under their arms and detailed plans and conspects. They have everything, but the return from the training that they count on doesn't appear. It isn't because they formally approach preparing the plans and conspects and developing training as, for example, the commander of the communications electrical squad, Petty Officer 2nd Class V. Gilyazov.

After the planned training the section's combat and political training book was filled with solid "5's". Yet the column where they put the number of faults detected in the electrical circuitry and the time each sailor spent eliminating them was empty. And this data allows the commander to judge how the development of specialists is going, which of them is making how many erroneous actions and so forth. When the ship's electricians averted a short circuit because of the intervention of an officer, it was explained that their practical training didn't conform to the high marks.

Does Gilyazov understand that with such training it is impossible to start the development of the subsequent and undoubtedly more complicated theme as indicated on the training schedule? He certainly understands. And he reassures himself with "We will make up for it with additional training".

Why do some petty officers who have clarified their own missions in fact not really complete them? I think that they have problems with self-discipline and personal responsibility for preparing the combat shipboard element entrusted to them in a model fashion.

One must self-critically recognize that we commanders of petty officers don't work enough on indoctrinating these qualities. For some reason we do not assess deviations from the training schedule that petty officers allow as violations of the commander's orders and we do not hold the guilty persons fully responsible.

The violations by word and deed of some petty officers in their work habits also leads to the fact that their subordinates become non-complying people. How can it be any other way? When a young replacement arrives on the ship the novices are impressed with the ideas that what is planned is law. But that same warrant officer who has worked to support the daily schedule at his own discretion reduces the hours spent on sailors' independent training. Is it surprising that some petty officers lose the desire to always be punctual?

And the instructor-methodological exercises give our petty officers a small indoctrinational charge. We only casually mention their responsibilities and command duty and responsibility in these exercises, but instead talk more about tactical-technical calculations, methods of working with a unit's equipment, etc. Of course, you can't manage without these things, but those calculations and methods must be considered as a means for the absolute and total completion of missions assigned by the commander on the weekly schedule.

In this regard it would be good for petty officers to know how to achieve the assigned goal according to the well-known formula, "to know, to be able, to

have". What does this mean? For example, after the training w... Officer 2nd Class Gilyazov conducted the sailors had to know all the requirements of the "Combat Crew" handbook, safety measures while working, user currents and the rules for servicing the management. "To be able" means completing the individual norms and record exercises under various sea conditions. "To have" is also very necessary and relates primarily to the practical skills in finding and eliminating possible damage to electrical cables and user current. These are the skills which would allow them to complete 50 percent of the record exercises at no lower than "good" and "outstanding". Otherwise sailors would not be admitted to the later exams for higher grades.

If Gilyazov's subordinates had clearly pictured what was behind the words "to know, be able and have" they would have had a different attitude toward training and the petty officer would not have had to blush because of his non-objective evaluations.

There is a direct link between an increased grade and an oversimplification as they both mask sailors' training and are a gross violation of the training schedule. Unfortunately, such facts are seldom analyzed at petty officer meetings and are not discussed at Komsomol meetings.

And I would like to talk about one more thing. The state of a section's discipline is fairly considered in assigning places in competition. But, for example, aren't deviations from the training schedule in time, completeness or the quality of the mission developed violations? They undoubtedly are. I suppose each such fact must be looked at when reviewing competition.

Certainly these and other measures don't exhaust the reserves for increasing petty officer responsibility for qualitatively conducting planned section training. But it seems that by doing them it is possible to elevate petty officer self-discipline and impel them to show more initiative and methodologically justified novelty. While beginning an exercise or training, petty officers must clearly picture how to organize the training so that each sailor gets the sum of the information and skills indicated by the commander on the training schedule.

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